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Abstract David Shoemaker has claimed that a binary
approach to moral responsibility leaves out something
important, namely instances of marginal agency, cases
where agents seem to be eligible for some responsibility
responses but not others. In this paper we endorse and
extend Shoemaker’s approach by presenting and
discussing one more case of marginal agency not yet
covered by Shoemaker or in the other literature onmoral
responsibility. Our case is that of Kenneth Parks, a
Canadian man who drove a long way to his mother-in-
law’s and killed her in a state of somnambulism. We
support our claim about Parks’ marginal responsibility
in three steps: we first deny that Parks acts involuntarily
as traditionally claimed in the legal literature; we then
propose to extend Shoemaker’s analysis of marginal
responsibility based on quality of will so as to include
two other dimensions: the moral status of the agent and
the actual causal effects of their actions; finally, we
distinguish Parks’ marginal responsibility from four
other existing concepts: Btracing^ (drunken cases), di-
minished responsibility (minor mental disorders), causal
responsibility (Williams’ unlucky lorry driver), and
moral disapproval without responsibility (bad actions
by small children, animals, or machines).
Keywords Consciousness andmoral responsibility .
Marginal agency.Marginal responsibility . Reactive
attitudes . Strawsonian theory of responsibility . David
Shoemaker
Introduction
When it comes to moral responsibility, we do not be-
lieve in a simple dichotomy. A binary distinction be-
tween being morally responsible and not being morally
responsible leaves out something important. In Respon-
sibility from the Margins [1] David Shoemaker has
argued against a binary approach by claiming that this
leaves out instances of what he calls Bmarginal agency ,^
cases where agents seem to be Beligible for some re-
sponsibility responses but not others^ (4). In this paper
we endorse and extend Shoemaker’s approach by pre-
senting and discussing one more case of marginal agen-
cy not yet covered by Shoemaker or in the other litera-
ture on moral responsibility. Our case is that of Kenneth
Parks, a Canadian man who was acquitted for the mur-
der of his mother-in-law in 1987 on the grounds that he
was sleepwalking during the act.Whereas we agree with
Parks’ legal acquittal, in this paper we address the issue
of Parks’ moral responsibility. In Parks’ case it seems
difficult to say that he is morally responsible for killing
his mother in law; but it seems also unsatisfactory to
have to just equate his story with a random accident, for
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which no normative evaluation of the agent would be
appropriate.
We endorse a Strawsonian approach to responsibility
insofar as we center our responsibility analysis on the
(appropriate) emotional responses or Breactive
attitudes^ towards human agents. However, we also
endorse Shoemaker’s criticism of Strawson’s idea of
Bquality of will^ of the agent as being the sole explan-
atory or justificatory element for reactive attitudes. In
fact, we push Shoemaker’s critique even further. Shoe-
maker advocates for a broader, pluralistic, quality of will
approach, one that can help making sense of some
reactive attitudes towards a set of agents affected by
mental conditions impairing some of their general ca-
pacities for moral agency: depression, psychopathy, au-
tism. We propose to add to the analysis of marginal
responsibility two other dimensions: the moral status
of the agent and the actual causal effects of their actions.
By doing so, we will be able to push the margins of
responsibility a bit further so as to cover a case like
Parks, a mentally sound person killing while asleep.
Our main claim is that Parks, while both falling short
of fully satisfying what we see as the three conditions for
moral responsibility – status, voluntary action, causation -
and falling short of manifesting any bad will in any of the
senses mapped by Shoemaker may be still seen as re-
sponsible in some way for his behavior. Parks, we argue,
is a full moral agent whose clouded consciousness is both
temporary and partial (status condition); his actions are
not involuntary and goal-directed (voluntary action con-
dition); the death of Parks’ mother-in-law is non-
deviantly causally dependent on his actions (causation
condition). That’s why, we argue, failing to be open to
standard moral reactions like blame and condemnation,
Parks can still be legitimately open to some resentment, at
least from those who have suffered because of his actions.
Indeed, literature on moral responsibility has covered
various hard cases which may be seen in some respect as
similar to Parks: indirect moral responsibility (aka
Btracing^, like in classic drunken cases), diminished re-
sponsibility (Shoemaker’s agents affected by mental dis-
orders), sheer causal responsibility (Williams’ unlucky
lorry driver), andmeremoral disapproval without respon-
sibility (bad actions by small children, animals, and smart
machines). We claim that Parks’ case is relevantly differ-
ent from these, and we devote the last section of this
paper (Beyond Tracing, Diminished Responsibility, Mor-
al Disapproval without Moral Responsibility, and Causal
Responsibility Section) to map these differences.
Before that, in Involuntariness and Parks Acts Sec-
tions we challenge the traditional legal approach [2–4],
which describes agents like Parks as acting involuntari-
ly; in Parks’ Moral Responsibility Section, we present
and endorse the claim shared by traditional theories of
moral responsibility according to which Parks is not
paradigmatically blameworthy for his actions; we move
beyond this traditional approach by endorsing Shoe-
maker’s idea of marginal responsibility; and we propose
to extend the analysis of marginal responsibility so as to
include moral status and causation as two of its dimen-
sions; in this way we set the stage for our claim about
Parks’ marginal responsibility. In Parks’Marginal Mor-
al Responsibility Section, we then present and defend
our case about Parks’ marginal responsibility.
Involuntariness
In the early hours of May 23rd 1987 Parks rose from the
couch on which he had fallen asleep, put on his shoes
and jacket, walked to his car and drove 23 km to the
home of his parents-in-law; he entered their house,
strangled his father-in-law into unconsciousness and
stabbed his mother in law to death. He then drove to a
nearby police station where, in a state of great confu-
sion, he said that he thought he had probably killed
someone.1
Parks was acquitted for the killing of his mother-in-
law and the serious injury to his father-in-law, as it was
proven that even if the killing and the injury had been
done by him, he did them in a state of somnambulism,
and so he qualifies for the defence of Bnon-insane
automatism^ [5]. In the legal literature, the standard
interpretation of this kind of acquittal is that people like
Parks are not liable as their behaviour cannot be seen as
voluntary action [6]. Here is Herbert L.A. Hart ([2]:
105): BIn the unconscious cases … the movements that
we call involuntary are not part of any action the agent
takes himself to be doing^; and here is Michael Moore
[3]: Bwithout consciousness … sub-personal agencies
do not represent ourwilling or our action^. That autom-
atism is seen in the law as amounting to involuntariness
1 R. v. Parks [5] 2 S.C.R. 871; Broughton et al. [6]. We assume that the
reconstruction of the facts done in court is accurate and Parks was
really in a state of somnambulism when he did what he did. Moreover,
we rely on current scientific accounts of somnambulistic action as they
are presented, for example, in Ebrahim and Fenwick [7] and Morrison
et al. [8].
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of action and not only to a lack of specific intention in a
voluntary action2 is relevant for our purposes; in fact, by
denying the voluntariness of action, legal automatism
works as a complete defence for any kind of legal
responsibility; not only for crimes for which intention
is required (e.g. theft or murder), but also for wrongs for
which specific intention is not required, i.e. negligence,
strict liability or tort liability [2].
In this and the following section we challenge this
view by arguing that Parks’ somnambulistic behaviour
should not be considered as involuntary action and that
(at least part of) his behaviour during his somnambulism
episode should count as genuine agency. These two
claims are related to each other but we will defend them
in turn starting from the former.
A first possible way of arguing for Parks’ involun-
tariness is to appeal to the unconscious or unaware
nature of his behaviours. Here one could just stipulate
that voluntary action is necessarily conscious or aware
and argue that since Parks’ behaviours during his som-
nambulism episode are unconscious or unaware, then
Parks’ behaviours are, by definition, involuntary. In
order to make this claim plausible one will have to
preliminarily show that Parks’ behaviour during the
somnambulism episode is indeed unconscious or un-
aware – and that is a complicated matter which partly
depends on empirical considerations. Secondly, one will
have to also show – again preliminarily – that con-
sciousness or awareness is indeed necessary for
voluntariness.
As for the question of Parks’ consciousness, states of
somnambulism are uncontroversially states which are
less than fully conscious – being awake is, after all, one
paradigmatic way of being conscious. However, sleep-
walkers like Parks are also clearly not fully unconscious
- they have open eyes and are sensitive to some envi-
ronmental stimuli [6]. As for Parks’ consciousness be-
ing or not sufficient for voluntariness, an important point
in this respect is that many actions are carried out in a
less than fully conscious way. Indeed, we often act
habitually or automatically without previous reflection
on what we are going to do and also without attention to
our performances while we are acting3: think of walking
up a flight of stairs; typing your pin number; shifting
gear while driving home; going through your morning
routine; carrying out complicated skilled performances
such as those involved in sport or music. In these and
related cases actions appear to be less than fully con-
scious: it’s not just that we don’t need previous deliber-
ation or conscious attention to the performance; often
conscious involvement would be counterproductive to
the successful completion of the task.4 Still, we usually
consider these to be fully voluntary actions.
It is important to point out that at least some of the
tasks that Parks successfully completes during his epi-
sode of somnambulism are automatic and habitual in the
relevant sense: Parks amazingly drives more than 20 km
to get to his in-laws, and such a long drive involves
several learned skilled performances that Parks has ac-
quired through years of practice. Admittedly, Parks’
actions are different from those in the examples de-
scribed above [9]. Following a useful distinction pro-
posed by Levy [15],5 it can be said that habitual and
automatic behaviour while awake are cases of ‘local
automatism’ whereas Parks’ somnambulistic actions
are an example of ‘global automatism’. However, as
Levy himself admits, the mechanisms underlying local
and global automatism may be the same – Levy calls
these mechanisms action scripts – so that it is at least not
obvious that global automatism is incompatible with the
performance of voluntary actions.6
A second way of defending the involuntariness of
Parks’ actions would be to appeal to a Davidsonian
account of action. According to Davidson [17], some
movement is an action only if it is intentional under at
least one true description. If Parks’ movements during
his episode of somnambulism turned out to be inten-
tional under no description, then none of his movements
would turn out to be actions in Davidsonian terms. Is
this the case? Intentional action, according to Davidson,
means action caused by the agent’s relevant beliefs and
desires. Again, there is no reason to assume that Parks
does not desire to open the door, drive his car, etc., or
that these actions are not caused by relevant beliefs of
his.
2 More on the relation between voluntariness and intention below in
this section, where Davidson’s theory is discussed.
3 See Wigley [9], Di Nucci [10–12]
4 There is plenty of relevant empirical data here – for example
Beilock’s experiments with expert golfers – see [13, 14].
5 See also [16].
6 Indeed, Levy only argues that global automatism is incompatible
with responsibility, without arguing that it is incompatible with agency.
We discuss issues of responsibility in Parks’ Moral Responsibility,
Parks’ Marginal Moral Responsibility and Beyond Tracing, Dimin-
ished Responsibility, Moral Disapproval withoutMoral Responsibility,
and Causal Responsibility Sections below.
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One could try to describe Parks’ individual actions as
unintentional in the sense of mistaken, as in caused by
ignorance of relevant details or false beliefs. In
Davidson’s classic case of unintentional action [17], an
agent boards a plane headed to London, Ontario with the
intention to board a plane headed to London, England.
However, some of Parks’ actions are clearly guided
by his true beliefs and knowledge, e.g. he takes what he
knows to be his car as he correctly believes that it is a
good way to reach what he knows to be his in-laws’
house, and he gets there because he knows the way.7
Secondly - and more importantly - even if one were to
concede that Parks’ actions were unintentional in this
sense, this would not make them involuntary.
Davidson’s unfortunate passenger is intentionally
boarding a plane, even though by being ignorant or
mistaken about its destination he is not intentionally
boarding a plane headed to London, Ontario. Note here
that it is the very same description which is unintention-
al that is not involuntary: Davidson’s unfortunate pas-
senger unintentionally but voluntarily boards a plane
headed to London, Ontario. Something similar may be
true of Parks’ actions.8
Before concluding this section, we would like to
anticipate a further possible objection. It may be thought
that what we have said so far may apply to some but not
all of what Parks does during his somnambulism epi-
sode. Here is Levy again: BViolence in these cases may
be caused when the overlearned script is interrupted,
with the interruption interpreted by the unconscious
agent as a threat^ ([15]: 75; see also [18]). So that, in
Levy’s language, while the driving, say, goes according
to the script, the killing is only the result of the sudden
interruption of that very script. We do not want to
dispute this psychological explanation of sleepwalking
violence and killing, or to deny that there are differences
between, say, Parks’ driving and Parks’ killing.
However, first, even if Parks’ stabbing of his mother-
in-law was indeed the result of a sudden interruption of
an overlearned routine (and in this respect different from
everything else that Parks does during his episode), that
would still not make it comparable to a simple reflex,
because of the skilful and coordinated response to the
environment involved. Even Levy admits that Parks’
Baction of stabbing his mother in law... was certainly
caused by content bearing mental states. It was not a
mere reflex; it employed a tool in a manner appropriate
to that tool... Parks utilizes a knife in a knife-appropriate
manner, thereby responding to the overlearned
affordances^ ([15]:66).9 Moreover, for the purposes of
our argument the actual character of Parks’ stabbing is
not crucial: firstly, because whether or not Parks’ routine
was interrupted in the above way, that would not change
the nature of what he does before the interruption; and
secondly and most importantly, because it is possible to
imagine alternative cases of sleepwalking where agents
do morally relevant things which are not the conse-
quence of an interruption.
It is at least not obvious, we have argued in this
section, that Parks acts involuntarily. Now we argue that
this is because what Parks does during his episode of
somnambulism should count as genuine agency.
Parks Acts
Our basic claim is that it is an unhelpful simplification of
human agency to equate Parks’ complicated perfor-
mances during his episode of somnambulism with par-
adigmatic involuntary actions like reflex movements or
epileptic fits.10 We argue that at least some of Parks’
performances during his somnambulism episode are
genuine actions, by showing in which relevant ways
what Parks does is different from the mere movements
which sometimes just happen to us without being done
by us: reflexes; epileptic fits; being pushed over.
There are two separate ways in which what Parks does
shares many important features with paradigmatic human
actions: on the one hand in terms of the performance
itself and on the other hand in terms of their relation with
the individual agent who is the author of the perfor-
mance. In terms of Parks’ performance, this has many
features in common with paradigmatic actions:
a) Parks’ performance is goal-directed: Parks presum-
ably gets up, opens his front door and that of his
garage, goes to his car, opens it, turns it on, drives it
off onto the road and follows a more than 20 km
long route to the house of his in-laws, then steps out
of the car and into the house; in turn, these
7 More on this in Parks Acts section below.
8 Again, here see [9].
9 Levy in the same passage also writes: BHowever, like the actions of
the alien hand, the behaviour is driven by low level motor representa-
tions, not by the personal level beliefs of the agent^ ([15]:66).
10 A position endorsed by Moore [3], Schopp [4], and criticised by
Williams [19] and [20].
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performances require many complicated subordi-
nated activities in order to be successfully carried
out. This complicated structure of different levels of
goal-directed behaviours cannot be compared to
random goalless movements that we sometimes
perform both when asleep and when awake;
b) Parks’ performance requires a high degree of coor-
dination: anybody who has gone through the chal-
lenging and time-consuming practice of learning
how to drive a car can testify to the amount of
coordination that only that particular part of Parks’
performance requires; these are not basic or simple
acts, like the proverbial (at least in philosophy)
raising of one’s arm – these are activities which a
statistically relevant percentage of the human pop-
ulation never masters; this level of coordination
shows that the performances in question have noth-
ing to do with luck or randomness;
c) Parks’ performance is responsive to the environ-
ment: as Parks drove more than 20 km, we must
assume that he must have overtaken other cars; he
must have in turn been overtaken; he will have
likely reacted to and avoided objects and other
obstacles both on his drive and on his way to the
car and from the car; we also know, for example,
that Parks must have driven through at least four
different sets of traffic lights on his way to his in-
laws. Also think of the non-trivial problem solving
involved in what Parks achieved: already getting
into the house of his parents-in-law constituted a
complex problem that Parks had to solve and did
solve while sleepwalking; this shows a significant
degree of flexibility and responsiveness to a chang-
ing environment;
d) Exercise of individual ability and skills: see above;
but also suppose that Parks had been a soldier or a
butcher who had taken his gun/knife with him or
had used the gun/knife he found in his in-laws’
house. The point is that the abilities and skills
required in such a case aren’t just general but they
rather have to do with the particular training and
biography of the individual agent so that we can
meaningfully attribute the performance to a partic-
ular skilled and trained agent.
Those are all features which Parks’ performance
during his somnambulism episode shares with paradig-
matic cases of action; so that if we said that Parks just
moves his body but does not perform genuine actions
during his episode of somnambulism, we wouldn’t be
able to explain any of the important features above.
So far we have focused on the nature and properties
of Parks’ performance – but we should also emphasize
the important links between Parks’ performances and
Parks himself as an individual agent. Parks also deploys
individual abilities and knowledge such as his ability to
drive along a route that he knows well, for example. Not
everybody could have done what Parks did – no matter
if asleep or awake: this distinguishes Parks’ complicated
performances during his sleepwalking episode from
more basic movements while sleepwalking (or even
while just sleeping or being awake) that just any able
body could perform.
Summing up, there are at least two different ways in
which what Parks does can and should be distinguished
from mere bodily movements: on the one hand, Parks’
movements are goal directed, coordinated, responsive to
the environment, and also the expression of individual
abilities, skills, and knowledge – in this respect Parks’
movements share those agential features with paradig-
matic actions. On the other hand, there are features of
the situation which enable us to identify Parks as the
agent of those performances: for example Parks’ indi-
vidual history and Parks’ individual capacities and
knowledge.
Parks’ Moral Responsibility
Parks should not be held criminally liable, and he is not a
good candidate for what we may call paradigmatic moral
responsibility either. In this sense, we do not disagree
either with mainstream legal literature or with main-
stream non-Strawsonian theories of moral responsibility
(e.g. Fischer-Ravizza [21], Levy [15], Frankfurt [22]).
Our concern is not that these theories deliver the wrong
result about Parks’ moral blameworthiness; it is rather
that, binary as these theories are, once they have denied,
respectively, legal culpability and moral blamewothiness,
there is nothing else that they can say about the moral
appropriateness of reactive attitudes towards Parks.
That is where Strawsonian theories may have an
advantage: they are able to allow for reactive attitudes
towards Parks; the problem with these approaches is
that, on the emotivist version which just reduces moral
responsibility to reactive attitudes, Parks will implausi-
bly turn out to be paradigmatically morally responsible
– so that on these theories, for instance, his wife leaving
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him as a reaction to his deeds would just amount to
Parks’ moral responsibility.
A more fruitful approach, in this respect, is represent-
ed by those Strawsonians [1, 23, 24] who, following up
on Strawson’s original statement on the relevance of the
agent’s will in triggering moral reactions, distinguish
between appropriate and inappropriate reactive attitudes
and insist that moral responsibility amounts to appropri-
ate moral reactions: other reactions, however psycho-
logically understandable, are not morally defensible. In
particular, in his Responsibility from the Margins [1],
Shoemaker has proposed to expand the quality of will
approach so as to make sense of marginal agency, a set
of instances of agents which seem to be Beligible for
some responsibility responses but not others^.
Shoemaker thinks that one’s will can be bad (or
good) in different ways, and thus we need a more
sophisticated and fine-grained analysis of what a bad
(or good) will is and which responses are appropriate to
which kind of badness (goodness). He calls this a plu-
ralistic approach to quality of will. According to Shoe-
maker when we react to someone’s bad will we may be
reacting to three different things: their bad character,
their wrong judgement, and their poor regard. An im-
portant consequence of this is the following: as some
agents may and in fact do lack the capacity or compe-
tence to express one or more of these qualities of will
(but not others) – they may be Bexempted^ from some
legitimate reactive attitudes but not from all of them. For
instance, according to Shoemaker, it is not fair to nega-
tively react to a psychopath’s behavior because of the
wrong normative judgements it is based upon, insofar as
psychopaths allegedly lack the relevant capacity for
moral judgement; however, it is fair to negatively react
to the cruelty of a psychopath behavior, insofar as this is
evidence of a bad character. Based on his tripartite
model of quality of will, Shoemaker presents and dis-
cusses a series of mental conditions which make agents
able to express not full but only marginal moral agency,
and are therefore open to only some but not the full
range of reactive attitudes. These conditions include
depression, scrupulosity, psychopathy, autism, mild in-
tellectual disabilities, deprivation and dementia. Where-
as we endorse Shoemaker’s project of mapping the
varieties of marginal agency and marginal moral respon-
sibility, we think that Shoemaker’s map is not complete.
In what follows we propose to consider Kenneth Park’s
somnambulistic killing as a new case of marginal agen-
cy, one for which one specific kind of moral reaction is
appropriate. Whereas admittedly rare, the case high-
lights two important general respects in which Shoe-
maker’s account may be integrated: accounting for cases
where a generally competent moral agent finds himself
acting under mental conditions that temporarily impair
his intellectual and moral capacities (the importance of
moral status); highlighting the importance of the causal
effects of behavior in the world (some people but not
others may legitimately respond to someone’s
behavior).
Shoemaker’s focus is on quality of will: whenever an
agent is unable to exercise any relevant moral capacity
then they are exempted from any moral responsibility.
That means that they are not appropriate recipients of
any reactive attitude by anyone. We think this is an
undesirable conclusion. In our view blame, condemna-
tion and resentment are typically appropriate when the
following conditions are met11:
– (STATUS) at the time of action the agent is a full
member of the moral community, i.e. she is not a
small child, or seriously mentally disabled;
– (VOLUNTARYACTION) the agent’s behaviour is
not involuntary, in the sense of being attributable to
him as something she did, not something that hap-
pened to her (a reflex, a fit, etc.);
– (CAUSATION) the agent’s behaviour has the right
causal connection with a bad outcome (causation
requirement);
Parks is not paradigmatically morally responsible
because whereas he meets the causation condition he
falls short of fully satisfying the status and voluntary
action conditions. In fact, as for the voluntariness re-
quirement, his condition of clouded consciousness
makes his actions not fully attributable to him; for in-
stance, he is not sensitive and responsive to many rele-
vant stimuli that may modulate or inhibit his action12; as
for the status requirement (3) though Parks is not a child
or a mentally disabled person his rational capacities –
i.e. mental, linguistic, social – during the somnambulism
episode are dramatically limited, in a similar way as that
11 We follow and adapt here BernardWilliams’ [25] four elements list:
cause, state, intention, response. Our list also reflects some basic legal
requirement for criminal responsibility present in the majority of legal
criminal systems, namely: the causation requirement, the voluntary act
requirement, the mental capacity requirement (not being a child or
legally insane).
12 Schopp [4]; Levy and Bayne [16].
40 Santoni de Sio F, Di Nucci E.
which make small children and some mentally disabled
generally non-responsible for their actions. For instance,
Parks is not responsive to a wide set of features of the
environment, cannot arguably attribute meaning and
value to any states of affairs, cannot set complex goals
and structure his behaviour consistently towards the
pursuit of those goals, is not responsive to (moral)
reasons against the pursuit of these goals, etc. Moreover,
he doesn’t seem to manifest any bad quality of will in
any of the senses mapped by Shoemaker.
The status requirement is thus wider than the volun-
tariness requirement as the general reduction of mental
capacities affects the moral status that an agent deserves
in a community, whereas the involuntariness require-
ment concerns the psychological conditions of the sub-
ject in relation to the performance of one individual
action or activity at a particular time.13
Given that Parks fails to fully satisfy two of the three
basic requirements for moral responsibility, what we call
the paradigmatic moral reactions – blame, indignation,
condemnation, legal liability and punishment – do not
seem to be suitable in his case. So far, we agree with
most responsibility theorists. However, whereas these
would stop here, we think there is more to say about
Parks’ responsibility.
Parks’ Marginal Moral Responsibility
Imagine Parks was married to your sister; he would have
then killed your mother. You will not only be extremely
upset; you may resent him, because his behaviour has
caused extreme suffering to you and yours for which
there is no plausible justification. You may expect him
to apologize, to make up, to show that he understands
that he has caused you so much suffering through his
actions. Imagine also that Parks, though deeply disap-
pointed and sorry for what has happened, were to show
that he does not understand why you would resent him,
given that, so he thinks, what happened was just a very
unfortunate circumstance for which no one (and anyway
not him) carries any moral responsibility. We think
Parks would be missing something important here.
In the real story, Parks was left by his wife four years
after his acquittal. We don’t know the details of the
story, nor do we want to make any speculations about
it.14 However, let us just assume, for the sake of our
argument, that Parks’ wife ended up leaving him be-
cause she couldn’t live with the fact that whereas she felt
entitled to resent him, at least to some extent, for the
death of her mother, he kept on behaving as if he had
nothing to be resented for, and he insisted that in the end
he was asmuch a victim of unfortunate circumstances as
his wife was. Now, even without addressing the issue as
to how much resentment would Parks’ wife be entitled
to, or as to what exact attitudes and actions should Parks
take in order to make up for what he has done, we would
agree that Parks’ wife – like other victims in this story,
and unlike complete strangers – is entitled to some (as
opposed to no) resentment towards Park; and that Parks
himself should feel and do something more than just
being deeply sorry in order to try to make up for his
catastrophic actions. So, while admitting that it would
not be fair to hold Parks culpable for the killing in a
paradigmatic way – e.g. call him a murderer, expect him
to be jailed, allow the whole community to be resentful
towards him – some actors in the story may legitimately
have some negative moral reaction towards him, and he
should not downplay his active and decisive role in the
tragedy. This is the gist of our claim about Park’s mar-
ginal moral responsibility.
In the rest of this section we provide arguments in
support of our claim; in the next and final section we
will highlight the difference between Parks’ marginal
responsibility and other existing concepts in the litera-
ture on moral responsibility.
In a nutshell, we argue that some particular moral
reactions toward Parks from some actors, typically the
victim’s family, may bemorally justified insofar as these
may legitimately insist that: a) their suffering is the
direct result of Parks’ voluntary actions; and b) as a sane
rational adult he is expected to understand that what he
did has directly caused unjustified suffering to others. In
the terms of the conditions for moral responsibility
introduced above, we may say that not only Parks fully
satisfies the causation requirement, as the death of his
mother-in-law is unequivocally caused by his
(voluntary) actions (Involuntariness and Parks Acts
13 We thus here agree with Levy [15] and disagree withWigley [9] that
a state of automatism being global rather than local is relevant for the
agent’s moral responsibility as global automatism affects the agent’s
moral and legal status, whereas local automatism may not.
14 Callwood (2002), offers a detailed reconstruction of Parks legal and
personal story, but her story stops at 1990, three years after the facts.
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Sections); but Parks also partly satisfies the status
requirement.
One might be tempted to equate Parks’ actions to the
behaviour of a person affected by a serious mental
disorder or a small child. Indeed, at the time of action
Parks finds himself under mental conditions that make
him - from a moral point of view - somehow similar to a
small child or a seriously mentally disabled person (see
section above). However, his somnambulistic condition
is temporary, his rational and moral capacities only
suspended,15 and his moral status as a responsible adult
not generally affected. In fact, when Parks realizes what
he has done, he is horrified and remorseful. And he
consistently behaves as most decent adults would do,
by reporting his deeds to the police. Parks is not a small
child or a seriously mentally disabled person, even
though he happens to find himself in a condition in
which he cannot exercise his moral capacities. It is to
establish this subtle equilibrium that Canadian law16
utilizes the concept of Bnon-insane automatism^: Parks
acts in a condition similar to that of a seriously mentally
disordered person – that’s why he is legally non-
culpable for his actions – but he is not a mentally
disordered person – that’s why unlike insane agents he
should not be treated as such, for instance by being
limited in his other legal capacities or even by being
eligible for compulsory mental treatment.17 We argue
that Parks’ peculiar actions not only require a specific
legal category but it also allows for a specific kind of
moral reaction; namely, some limited amount of resent-
ment from some particular agents directly affected by
his actions.
Parks being a full moral agent before and after his
episode makes an important moral difference. After the
episode he can (and he actually did) realize the serious-
ness of what he has done. Moreover, his episode of
somnambulism would not have happened had he not
been a rational, sane and morally competent adult hu-
man agent before the episode. In fact, his episode was
allegedly triggered by the emotional stress associated
with his awareness of his problems and debts and with
the prospect of talking about these with his family
members. That Parks had been preoccupied by his debts
and by how he illegally tried to cover them, and that he
was nervous about having to tell his in-laws about his
misdeeds on the next day is a basic – thought not
sufficient – element in the explanation of some of Parks’
acts. Finally, it is very likely that during his episode of
somnambulism Parks ‘decides’ to go to his in-laws’ as
opposed to any other place precisely because of the
complex network of desires and fears that he feels
towards them; and, as already mentioned in the discus-
sion on voluntariness, he manages to get there by con-
sistently deploying a number of individual skills and
knowledge acquired while awake (he can drive, he
knows the way there, etc.).
Admittedly, the causal connections between Parks
rational capacities and his behaviour are clearly anom-
alous, as are those between his beliefs and desires and
his somnambulistic decisions and actions. But this is not
the point. The point is that it doesn’t seem correct to
describe Parks either as a seriously deranged person
performing totally unintelligible actions or as a Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde story, that being a case of a com-
plete (pathological) dissociation of personality in which
different personas share a body and Bsuccessive selves^
cannot arguably be called to respond for the behaviour
of Bprevious selves^ [27].
By insisting on the importance of Parks’ general
moral status for his responsibility we are endorsing
here a point already made, among others, by Watson
[28], Scanlon [24] and McKenna [23] in the litera-
ture on moral responsibility.18 The main idea is that
attributions of (moral) responsibility are, in
McKenna’s words, calls for conversation. This ex-
plains why no reactive attitudes are morally appro-
priate towards agents that cannot properly master the
moral language (small children, seriously deranged
persons or animals and machines). However, com-
mitted to a quality of will reading of moral respon-
sibility as they are, these theories can only make
sense of paradigmatic moral reactions such as blame
and condemnation. We have claimed that whereas
blame and condemnation may be appropriate only
towards actions that reveal some morally objection-
able attitudes or have some other strong connection
to the agent’s moral dispositions, some marginal
reaction may be appropriate to actions that though
not representative of any negative attitudes are still
attributable to a moral agent, as something he has15 On the distinction between non-possession and suspension of a
capacity see Kenny [26].
16 English law has a similar construction.
17 Broughton et al. [6], provided it is proven that similar episodes are
extremely unlikely to occur again.
18 Duff [29]and Gardner [30] make similar claims in relation to legal
responsibility.
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done and he has to respond for. In this sense the
closest approach to ours in the moral responsibility
literature is George Sher’s [31], insofar as he insists
as we do that moral responsibility does not require
either conscious awareness or an action tracking a
morally reprehensible disposition of the agent; rather,
it just requires that a morally reprehensible action is
the effect of the agent’s Bcollection of physical and
psychological states whose elements interact to sus-
tain his characteristic patterns of conscious and ra-
tional activity^ (Sher [31]:124).19 Some version of
Sher’s theory might be more suitable to accept our
claim about Parks’ marginal responsibility than other
theories of moral responsibility. Be that as it may, in
its present version, Sher’s is yet another theory of
blame and condemnation, and it thus falls short of
discussing the appropriateness of other forms of
moral responsibility.
Beyond Tracing, Diminished Responsibility, Moral
Disapproval without Moral Responsibility,
and Causal Responsibility
Before concluding, we think it may be helpful to compare
and distinguish our claim about Parks’ marginal moral
responsibility from four existing concepts in the literature
about moral responsibility. We will claim that, on the
one hand, marginal moral responsibility is different and
arguably less serious qua moral responsibility than both
Bindirect moral responsibility^ (aka Btracing^), and
Bdiminished^ or Breduced responsibility^; on the other
hand, marginal moral responsibility is different and ar-
guably more serious qua moral responsibility than both
moral disapproval without moral responsibility and
Bcausal responsibility^ (see Table 1 below for a
summary). By drawing these distinctions we aim to
achieve three related goals: firstly, to give further support
to our claim that traditional concepts do not cover Parks’
case; secondly, to show that our claim about Parks
marginal moral responsibility is a genuine original new
philosophical reading of the story and not just a ratio-
nalization of a moral intuition implicitly triggered by a
more traditional reading; thirdly, that our claim starts to
fill a gap in the literature on moral responsibility.
Tracing
Typically, people who wrong others while in a state of
mental incapacitation – e.g. serious drunkenness – are
thought to be culpable for their behaviour if their state of
incapacitation is traceable to their previous culpable
action, e.g. culpably getting drunk. People know or
should know that by getting drunk they may end up
wronging others, for instance by dangerous driving, so
that when they do so they can be held morally respon-
sible. In these cases, moral responsibility is traced back
to the time in which agents were in possession of their
rational and moral capacities; Levy [15] calls this re-
sponsibility deriving from a previous blameworthy ac-
tions Bindirect moral responsibility .^ Unlike marginal
moral responsibility, indirect moral responsibility is a
full-fledged kind of responsibility that typically allows
for a wide range of moral reactions including blame and
condemnation. However, unlike the typical drunken
wrongdoer, Parks could not anticipate that an episode
of somnambulism with those consequences may have
occurred to him on that night; therefore, even though his
actions are somehow causally dependent on his previous
culpable actions, they are not causally dependent in the
right way, and he is thus not morally responsible accord-
ing to a standard account in terms of tracing.
Indeed, our account of Parks’ responsibility relies,
among other things, on there being a connection be-
tween Parks’ (wrong) behaviour while awake and his
behaviour during his somnambulistic episode, but in a
different way. We have pointed to some relevant con-
nections between Parks’ preoccupations at the time
leading up to the somnambulism episode and what
Parks does during his episode of somnambulism20;
and we have also insisted that what Parks does during
his episode of somnambulism would not be fully under-
standable without reference to his individual previous
history. This kind of link is not such as to generate any
tracing of moral responsibility. The reason why we have
stressed the existence of these links between Parks’
awake and somnambulistic life is just that this makes
more difficult for his victims to see his actions either as
totally random, i.e. non-attributable to any moral agent,
or attributable to a totally separated moral agent, as it is
somehow suggested in the case of agents affected by
19 Cf. Smith and Tognazzini [32].
20 Parks’ episode of somnambulism was most likely triggered among
other things by the stress linked to his next day’s very difficult meeting
with his in laws.
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serious pathological dissociations of personality [27]. It
also makes more difficult for Parks, after his awakening,
to see his past actions as total strangers to him, and thus
to refuse any responsibility for them.
Moreover, in standard cases of tracing moral respon-
sibility totally depends on: the faulty behaviour of the
non-incapacitated agent, this faulty behaviour causing a
dangerous state of incapacitation, and this incapacitation
causing harm to others; whereas the nature of the agent’s
behaviour while incapacitated is immaterial to respon-
sibility in tracing cases, Parks’ behaviour amounting to
some sort of genuine agency plays an important role in
marginal responsibility.
Diminished Responsibility
Marginal responsibility should also be distinguished
from what it is sometimes called Bdiminished
responsibility .^ Diminished responsibility typically ap-
plies to agents who do not enjoy the full status of moral
agents, for instance because they are affected with minor
personality disorders or are young adolescents. As we
see it, diminished responsibility is different, and possi-
bly more serious than marginal responsibility insofar as
it depends on a reduced moral status of the agent, and it
translates in a reduction of the blame and condemnation
due to her. It is a reduced but still paradigmatic form of
moral responsibility. Marginal responsibility rather de-
pends on a major if temporary suspension of rational
and moral capacities occurred to an agent who is other-
wise perfectly competent and enjoys the full status of
moral agent.
Moral Disapproval without Moral Responsibility
The fact that Parks enjoys, in general, the status of moral
agent and his incapacitation is only temporary, makes
his case also dramatically different, and arguably more
serious than cases of agents who perform morally bad
actions without enjoying that moral status. Think, for
instance, of vicious dogs, small toddlers or intelligent
machines carrying out bad actions or actions with rele-
vant moral consequences. As they cannot be morally
addressed or respond for those actions, these agents
aren’t the appropriate target of any moral reaction,
though one may still legitimately express moral disap-
proval of their actions, and possibly have some emo-
tional reaction to them.Ta
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Causal Responsibility
Finally, it is important to note that the limited
moral reactions associated with marginal moral re-
sponsibility, though less serious and wide-ranging
than those involved in paradigmatic cases of moral
responsibility, are still different and more serious
than those legitimately arising in scenarios in which
the agent’s role is purely causal, and there isn’t any
relevant connection between the agent’s self and his
actions, such as those discussed in the moral luck
literature – e.g. Bernard Williams’ unlucky lorry-
driver, Sofocle’s Oedipus, etc.21 To highlight the
difference between Parks and standard cases of
causal responsibility, one can imagine the alterna-
tive story of Sam Parks, which is the same as Ken
Parks except for three important elements: first,
Sam Parks’ somnambulism is triggered merely by
the physical stress undergone in the previous days
full of work and travelling in a sweltering climate;
secondly, once in a state of somnambulism, Sam
leaves his house on foot through an open door;
thirdly, while wandering without any recognizable
goal around his block, he happened to violently
bump into an elderly passerby, who eventually falls
to the ground, violently hits her head, and dies.22
We have argued that the victims’ (relatives, say)
resentment towards the real Ken Parks would be
more appropriate than the victims’ resentment to-
wards the imaginary Sam Parks. Whereas Sam
Parks’ role in the killing is almost purely causal –
he accidentally kills a passerby he casually encoun-
tered while randomly wandering during an episode
of somnambulism triggered by physical stress –
Ken Parks’, for the reasons discussed above, is
not. Sam’s not Ken’s story nicely fits with the idea
of (tragic) purely causal responsibility. Ken Parks’
story, though not less unfortunate and tragic, is so
in a slightly different way, one that allows for a
slightly but significantly different kind of moral
reaction both on the side of the victims and on
the side of the agent.
Conclusion
Our account makes sense of the inappropriateness of
holding agents like Parks legally culpable or morally
blameworthy without at the same time committing us to
having to deny their moral responsibility altogether.
Even though Parks’ story is admittedly rather unusual,
our point may have wider implications for the theory of
responsibility. While acting in conditions that do not
fully meet the standard criteria for blameworthiness,
moral agents may be the fair recipients of some other
appropriate moral reactions. Failing to be the fair recip-
ients of blame and condemnation, human agents may
still be marginally morally responsible for their actions.
Shoemaker [1] has already mapped some cases of mar-
ginal moral responsibility. We have claimed that this
map should be further integrated and we have started
doing so. Future research will explore other cases of
marginal moral responsibility.
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